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NAFTA Cross-Border Trucking:
Mexico Retaliates After Congress
Stops Mexican Trucks at the
Border
ABSTRACT

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
entitles Mexican tractor-trailers to enter the U.S. to deliver
cargo from Mexico. In spite of NAFTA, the U.S. has only
allowed Mexican trucks to operate in the U.S. during a
controversialdemonstrationproject that granted U.S. operating
licenses to a select number of Mexican trucks during the Bush
administration. The dispute over NAFTA's cross-border
trucking provisions climaxed on March 16, 2009, when Mexico
imposed $2.4 billion in retaliatory tariffs on U.S. imports in
response to U.S. noncompliance.
This Note chronicles the U.S.-Mexico cross-border trucking
dispute and argues that the U.S. should re-start a cross-border
trucking demonstration project in exchange for Mexico ceasing
its retaliatory tariffs. A demonstrationproject would inform a
U.S. policy that fully complies with NAFTA regarding crossborder trucking's challenges and safety issues. In addition, this
Note addresses the risks associated with allowing Mexican
trucks to operate in the U.S. and offers the U.S. some practical
suggestions for addressing these risks while complying with
NAFTA.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 16, 2009, Mexico announced its intention to impose
$2.4 billion in tariffs on United States (U.S.) imports in response to
the termination of a cross-border trucking Demonstration Project by
the U.S.1 The Demonstration Project, which licensed a select number
of Mexican tractor-trailers (motor carriers) to operate in the U.S., was
created by the Bush administration after a North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) arbitration panel held that the U.S. was
in violation of NAFTA's cross-border trucking provisions. 2 Although
the Demonstration Project did not technically satisfy the NAFTA
cross-border trucking provisions, which basically entitled all Mexican
trucks to operate within the U.S., it served as an armistice in the
growing controversy between the U.S. and Mexico. 3
However,
Congress broke the truce on March 11, 2009, when it removed
funding from the Demonstration Project, and Mexico immediately
struck back with tariffs on a variety of agricultural and industrial

1.
Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs 1 (Mar. 16,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-officeBriefing-by-WH-PressSecretary-Gibbs-3-16-09 [hereinafter White House Press Release]; Adriana Barrera &

Doug Palmer, Mexico Slaps Tariffs on U.S. Goods in Truck Feud, REUTERS, Mar. 16,
2009, http://www.reuters.comlarticle/topNews/idUSTRE52F7KN20090317?pageNumber=
1&virtualBrandChannel=10112&sp=true. For a list of the eighty-nine products and the
applicable tariff on each, see Ley de Comercio Exterior [Law of Foreign Trade], as
amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], Mar. 18, 2009 (Mex.).
2.
Mark J. Andrews et al., InternationalTransportation Law, 42 INT'L LAW.
631, 635-36 (2008); Michael C. McClintock, NAFTA'S 13th Year: Steadily Increasing

Trade Between the U.S. and Mexico, TransportationInfrastructure Crisis, Building a
"Dry Canal" Across Southern Mexico, and More, 14 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 25, 36, 38
(2007).
3.
See McClintock, supra note 2, at 38 (arguing that if the Demonstration
Project is successful, Mexico will presumably make a reciprocal commitment).
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products. 4 The dispute over cross-border trucking has incited a
"trade war ' 5 that threatens tens of thousands of U.S. jobs 6 and
seriously undermines U.S.-Mexico relations. 7 The U.S. must take
swift action in order to restore trade relations with Mexico and
8
preempt further weakening of the U.S. economy.
The Mexican retaliatory tariffs instantly elevated the subject of
an inconsequential thirteen-year debate to front-page news and
White House press statements. 9 The White House indicated that
resolving the trade dispute with Mexico was an "important priority,"
and stated that "exports create jobs here in this country and we don't
want to find ourselves, in time of economic slowdown, creating or
erecting a barrier to [Mexico]. ' 1° Only five days after President
Obama approved a law terminating the Demonstration Project,' 1
Press Secretary Robert Gibbs reported that "[t]he President has
tasked the Department of Transportation to work with the U.S. Trade
Representative and the Department of State ... to propose legislation
creating a new trucking project that will meet the legitimate concerns
12
of Congress and our NAFTA commitments."

4.
MARK P. SULLIVAN & JUNE S. BEITTEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEXICOU.S. RELATIONS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2009); see also Barrera & Palmer, supra note
1, at 1 ("Mexico slapped tariffs on 90 American agricultural and manufactured exports
on Monday in retaliation for Washington's move to block Mexican trucks from using
U.S. highways.").
5.
Mark Drajem, Mexico Imposes Tariffs on U.S. Amid Trucking Dispute,
BLOOMBERG, Mar. 17, 2009, http:/lwww.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=
anFlZqfyNPgE.
6.
Richard Read, Mexico's New Tariffs Could Cost Oregon Millions,
OREGONLIVE, Mar. 18, 2009, http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssfI2009/03/
mexican tariffs will cost oreg.html ('Mexico's tariffs could cost the U.S. more than
40,000 U.S. jobs, including roughly 1,000 in Oregon, according to one economist.").
7.
Martin Hutchinson, Doubly Dangerous Game, BREAKINGVIEWS, Mar. 17, 2009,
http://www.breakingviews.com/2009/03/17/mexico-nafta.aspx?sg-nytimes&precompiled=
true&keywords=martin%20hutchinson ("[P]rotectionists both sides of the border will use
[the $2.4 billion in tariffs] to pick apart NAFI'A, and that resulting economic problems could
further stoke Mexican anti-US feelings and harm relations.").
8.
See Mark Landler, Trade Barriers Rise as Slump Tightens Grip, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2009, at Al (stating Kenneth S. Rogoff's prediction that "[t]he next two
years could be a disaster for free trade").
9.
See, e.g., id. ('Mr. Obama ... scrapped a program enabling Mexican trucks
to haul cargo over long distances on American roads. Mexico retaliated by imposing
duties on $2.4 billion worth of American goods .... "); Marc Lacey & Ginger Thompson,
Obama's Next Foreign Crisis Could Be Next Door, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, at Al
("After the United States shut the border to Mexican trucks, in violation of a promise it
made under the North American Free Trade Agreement, Mexico placed tariffs on 89
American products .. "); White House Press Release, supra note 1, at 1 ('Today,
Mexico announced its intent to take retaliatory actions against a range of U.S.
exports.").
10.
White House Press Release, supra note 1, at 8.
11.
See H.R. Res. 1105, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted).
12.
White House Press Release, supra note 1, at 1.
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This press statement is somewhat surprising considering the

President's campaign statements.

During his campaign for the

presidency, then-Senator Obama opposed granting access to Mexican
motor carriers and argued that the U.S. needed to re-negotiate
NAFTA. 13 Nevertheless, the Obama administration announced that

Ray LaHood, the Secretary of Transportation, will soon meet with
members of Congress and propose guidelines in an effort to resolve
the dispute. 14 The administration seems to be slowly moving towards
compliance with NAFTA, but strong political forces continue to
impede significant reforms. 15 The administration may have some
difficulty in convincing Congress such reform is desirable, considering
that Congress has thus far overwhelmingly opposed licensing
6
Mexican motor carriers to operate in the U.S.1
Nevertheless, situations have changed and Congress may be
forced to re-evaluate its views on cross-border trucking with Mexico,
just as President Obama appears to be reconsidering his position on
the issue. 17 Mexico strategically devised the retaliatory tariffs to

have the greatest impact by "[choosing] products that originate in
forty U.S. states so U.S. lawmakers would receive the maximum
political pressure from constituents. ' 18 As a result, constituents in
many areas are clamoring for an international solution as the tariffs

13.
Press Release, Obama For Am., Obama Asks United Auto Workers To
Support the Candidate with a Record of Fighting for Them (Nov. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.barackobama.com/2007/11/13/obama asksunited-auto_workers.php.
The only trade agreements I believe in are ones that put workers first because
trade deals aren't good for the American people if they aren't good for working
people.... That's why I voted to block Mexican trucks from entering this
country. And that's why we need to amend NAFTA."
See also WIs. FAIR TRADE COAL., TRADE QUESTIONS FOR 2008 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES:
RESPONSES OF BARACK 03AMA 1-2, available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/pdfwftcobamaresponsestotradequestionnaire_02182008.pdf (documenting Obama's affirmative
response to a question asking presidential candidates whether they would commit to
renegotiating NAFTA within their first term of office).
14.
Steve Miller, Idling Ends for Rules on Mexican Trucks: U.S. Businesses
Await End to Ban, Retaliatory Tariffs, WASH. TIMES, July 27, 2009, at Al; LaHood to
Share Mexico Trucking Proposalwith Congress 'Soon', May 1, 2009, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
May 1, 2009, at 9.
15.
Steve Miller, New Mexican Truck Rules Please U.S. Business: U.S.
Businesses Await End to Ban, Retaliatory Tariffs, WASH. TIMES, July 27, 2009,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/27/idling-ends-for-rules-on-mexicantrucks.
16.
See, e.g., 153 CONG. REc. S11,393 (2007) (documenting the Senate's vote of
75 to 23 for the Dorgan Amendment, which prohibited funds from being used to
establish a Mexican cross-border trucking Demonstration Project).
17.
Obama Says This is Not the Time to Reopen NAFTA, REUTERS, Aug. 7,
2009, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N07416487.htm.
18.
Oscar Avila, BorderAllies Are on Edge, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 25, 2009, at 4, available
at http://www.chicagotribune.comJnews/nationworld/chi-mexico-clinton_25mar25,0,2051506.
story.
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threaten to snuff out their businesses.1 9 Lawmakers are listening 20
and will likely be more receptive to seeking compliance with NAFTA
in order to economically benefit many of their constituents.
Moreover, if President Obama seeks to bring the U.S. into compliance
with NAFTA, he can probably compel congressional acquiescence as
he continues to enjoy a relatively high approval rating and
Democratic control of Congress. 21 Therefore, the critical question is
not whether President Obama can create a new cross-border trucking
program but instead goes to what kind of program the Obama
administration plans to create.
The details of the Obama administration's objectives remain
unclear, 22 but Press Secretary Gibbs stated that President Obama
wanted to create a new trucking project that would meet the United
States' NAFTA obligations. 23 Although a compromise or other
temporary diplomatic solution with Mexico, such as the
Demonstration Project created by the Bush administration, would be
easier to achieve, Gibbs's statement implies that the current
administration has chosen to finally bring the U.S. into full
compliance with its NAFTA obligations. Complying with NAFTA will
undoubtedly be a challenging and unpopular task, but this Note
argues that the U.S. should prioritize compliance with international
law over domestic convenience. 24 Since entering office, President
Obama has continually proclaimed that the U.S. is looking to reestablish relationships with other countries. 2 5 During one of his

19.
Doug Palmer, LaHood Sends Obama Advice on Ending Trucking Dispute,
REUTERS, Apr. 13, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE53C68
F20090413.
20.
E.g., Letter from U.S. Representative Jeff Flake to President Barack Obama
1 (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://flake.house.govIUploadedFiles/obamaletter.pdf
(expressing support for the U.S.-Mexico cross-border trucking program and encouraging
steps to promote economic activity).
21.
David Lightman, Democrats in Congress Go Along with Obama-So far,
MCCLATCHY TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Mar. 29, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/106l
story/65014.html ("As long as Obama remains popular, most Democratic members of
Congress will likely be loyal and only occasionally show flashes of independence, while
most Republican lawmakers will be shut out of any meaningful role.").
22.
See Miller, supra note 14, at Al (stating that weeks have passed without
any action towards a plan to re-launch the trucking program).
23.
White House Press Release, supra note 1, at 1 ("The President has tasked
the Department of Transportation to work with the U.S. Trade Representative and the
Department of State, along with leaders in Congress and Mexican officials, to propose
legislation creating a new trucking project that will meet the legitimate concerns of
Congress and our NAFTA commitments.").
24.
Public Citizen, Bush's Mexico-Domiciled Trucks Plan Flunks Safety Rules,
http://www.citizen.org/autosafetylTruck-Safety/mex-trucks/articles.cfm?ID=16846 (last
visited Oct. 31, 2009) (identifying a study that showed 56% of Americans believed
allowing Mexican motor carriers past the commercial zones would be dangerous for
U.S. drivers).
25.
See, e.g., Sue Pleming, Obama Pledges New Start with Muslims, REUTERS, Jan.
20, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-BarackObama/idUSTRE50J5XK20090120
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recent visits to Mexico he spoke of the need to "launch a new era of
cooperation and partnership between" the U.S. and Mexico. 26 Now is
the time to act on these principles and demonstrate that the U.S.
honors its international agreements.
Part II of this Note provides a comprehensive chronology of
cross-border trucking between the U.S. and Mexico. This Part
describes the legal status of cross-border trucking prior to NAFTA, as
well as how NAFTA and other preceding legislation impacted the flow
of Mexican trucks into the U.S. Although the U.S., Mexico, and
Canada agreed to cross-border trucking provisions in NAFTA, this
Part will discuss how and why these obligations have not been met
between the U.S. and Mexico. Finally, this Part will cover the
multitude of congressional actions dealing with cross-border trucking,
as well as the Bush administration's recently terminated
Demonstration Project.
Part III will seek to establish the scope of the United States'
international cross-border trucking obligations under NAFTA. A
detailed review of the text of NAFTA and the 2001 NAFTA
arbitration panel's findings and recommendations will help provide a
framework for understanding these international obligations. 27 This
Part will review the NAFTA treaty and the arbitration panel's report
in order to provide legal guidelines for how the U.S. can treat
Mexican motor carriers differently than U.S. motor carriers but
remain in compliance with NAFTA. This treatment is an essential
pre-requisite for the proposal offered in Part IV. Part III will confirm
that the U.S. policy currently violates NAFTA and that the Mexican
retaliatory tariffs are legal under NAFTA.
Part IV will lay out a two-part solution that seeks to bring the
U.S. into compliance with NAFTA while also addressing the safety
concerns associated with allowing Mexican motor carriers into the
U.S. As it would be nafve to expect the U.S. to hastily reform its
trucking policies to comply with NAFTA cross-border trucking
provisions, this Part recommends that the Obama administration
first seek to re-establish a trucking pilot program with Mexico,
similar to the Demonstration Project in effect under the Bush
administration, in exchange for Mexico's elimination of retaliatory
tariffs.
Once the pilot program is operational, the Obama
administration should cautiously reform U.S. trucking policies to

(Tresident Barack Obama promised to improve U.S. ties with the Muslim world in his
inauguration address ....).
26.
Joint Press Conference with President Barack Obama and President Felipe
Calder6n in Mexico City, Mex. (Apr. 16, 2009), available at http:/Iblogs.suntimes.com/
weet/2009/04/obamacalderonmexicocity-pre.html
[hereinafter Mexico City Press
Conference].
27.
Dana T. Blackmore, Continuing to Put the Brakes on Mexican Truckers:
Will the U.S. Ever Implement NAFTA Annex I?, 9 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 699, 708
(2003).
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bring the U.S. into full compliance with NAFTA. In addition, this
Part discusses the risks associated with allowing Mexican motor
carriers onto U.S. roads and proposes practical restrictions and
regulations that will minimize safety concerns.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Events PrecedingNAFTA
On July 1, 1980, President Carter declared that he had signed
the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, which "remove[d] 45 years of excessive
and inflationary Government restrictions and redtape" on the
trucking industry. 28 This deregulatory Act allowed new trucking
companies to become licensed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) by showing that they were "fit, willing, and able to
provide the transportation," and that "the service proposed will serve
a useful public purpose. '29 This standard was substantially easier to
meet than the standard set in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 and
30
caused rapid growth in new trucking companies in the early 1980s.
Because the 1980 Act did not distinguish between U.S., Canadian,
and Mexican trucking companies, the statute also made it easier for
Canadian and Mexican trucking firms to become certified to operate
in the U.S. 3 1 Nevertheless, only five Mexican carriers seized the
opportunity before Congress removed this right to certification in
1982.32
Although the U.S. allowed Mexican and Canadian motor carriers
to operate in the U.S. with certification, Mexico refused to open its
border to U.S. trucking companies. 33 Consequently, in an effort to
encourage reciprocal agreements with Canada and Mexico on cross-

28.
Statement on Signing S. 2245 into Law, 16 PUB. PAPERS 1265, 1265 (July 1,
1980).
29.
Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, § 5(b)(1), 94 Stat. 793, 793
(1980) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10101).
30.
See Motor Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (repealed 1983)
(requiring trucking applicants to show that their service was "required by the present
or future public convenience and necessity"); Motor Carrier Act of 1980,
http://www.nationmaster.comencyclopediaMotor-Carrier-Act-of-1980 (last visited Oct.
31, 2009) ("A result of the law was that the number of new firms has increased
dramatically, especially low-cost, non-union carriers. By 1990 the number of licensed
carriers exceeded forty thousand, more than double the number in 1980.").

31.

Final Report of the Panel, In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services,

para. 36, Secretariat File No. USA-Mex-98-2008-01 (Feb. 6, 2001) [hereinafter NAFTA
Final Report], availableat http://www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta20/truckingservices.pdf.
32.
Id. para. 59.
33.
See Memorandum on the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, 18 PUB.
PAPERS 1180, 1181 (Sept. 20, 1982) (President Reagan's statement to the U.S. Trade
Representative noting "[a] substantial disparity between the relatively open access
afforded Mexican trucking service coming into the United States and the almost
complete inability of United States trucking interests to provide service into Mexico").
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border trucking,3 4 Congress passed the Bus Regulation Reform Act of
1982, which imposed a two-year moratorium on the issuance of new
U.S. highway authorizations for motor carriers domiciled in a foreign
country or owned or controlled by foreigners.3 5 This Act, which
applied equally to Canada and Mexico, authorized the President to
remove or modify any part of the moratorium, and President Reagan
exercised this power immediately.36 On September 20, 1982, the
same day the President issued his signing statement on the bill,
President Reagan suspended the moratorium with regards to Canada
because he believed "[the U.S.] trucking industry is not now, nor has
it been, precluded from providing service into [Canada]. '' 37 In the
same memorandum, President Reagan noted that he would not
modify the moratorium with regards to Mexico given "the almost
complete inability of U.S. trucking interests to provide service into
Mexico. '3 8 This moratorium, which effectively prevented Mexican
motor carriers from qualifying for operating licenses in the U.S., was
39
extended in 1984, 1986, 1988, 1992, and 1995.
Although the moratorium generally prevented Mexican motor
carriers from entering the U.S., there were a few exceptions that
continue to apply today. First, Mexican motor carriers that already
had a license to operate in the U.S. were "grandfathered in" and not
affected by the Bus Regulatory Act of 1982.40 Second, Mexican motor
carriers destined for Canada were permitted to transit through the
U.S., as long as they complied with U.S. safety regulations and
insurance requirements. 41 Third, and most significantly, Mexican
motor carriers were allowed to cross the border into "commercial

34.
See NAFTA Final Report, supra note 31, para. 43 ("The purpose of the
moratorium was to encourage Mexico and Canada to lift their restrictions on market
access for U.S. firms."); cf. Memorandum on the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982,
supra note 33, at 1181 (President Reagan's statement regarding the moratorium,
urging the U.S. Trade Representative to "intensify our efforts to negotiate a fair and
equitable resolution of [the transborder trucking issue] with both Canada and Mexico").
35.
Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 6(g)(1), 96 Stat.
1102 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 902(c) (2005)).
[T]he Commission . . . shall not issue any certificate to any motor common
carrier, or any permit to any motor contract carrier, domiciled in any
contiguous foreign country or owned or controlled by persons of any contiguous
foreign country in the two-year period beginning on the effective date of this
subsection.
36.
37.
1181.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. § 6(g)(1)(2).
Memorandum on the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, supra note 33, at
Id.
NAFTA Final Report, supra note 31, para. 41.
Id. para. 44, 59.
Id. para. 44, 57.
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zones" in the U.S., 42 which extend between 2 and 20 miles into the
U.S. depending on the population of the border city. 4 3 Although
Mexican motor carriers were still required to obtain a Certificate of
Registration before entering the commercial zones, the certification
has been relatively easy to attain; 44 consequently, Mexican truck
traffic in the commercial zones of the U.S. has increased greatly since
1982. 45 Currently, thousands of Mexican trucks cross the border into
46
U.S. commercial zones each day.
Critics have found fault with the process of transporting goods
across the border into U.S. commercial zones, describing it as
inefficient, expensive, and environmentally damaging. 47 Generally,
long-haul Mexican motor carriers stop short of the border and a
Mexican "drayage" service truck ferries the goods across the border
into the U.S. commercial zones. 48
Thereafter, the goods are
transported to a U.S. motor carrier that carries the goods to their
final destination in the U.S., while the drayage service truck returns
to Mexico without any cargo and picks up another load.4 9 This

42.
Id. para. 44, 178-79; see also U.S. Department of Transportation, Cross Border
Truck Safety Inspection Program, http://www.dot.gov/affairs/cbtsip/factsheet.htm (last
visited Oct. 31, 2009) (noting that Mexican trucks can enter U.S. commercial zones in areas
such as San Diego, El Paso, and Brownsville).
43.
NAFTA Final Report, supra note 31, para. 47; see also 49 C.F.R. § 372.241
(1997) (defining commercial zones).
44.
NAFTA Final Report, supranote 31, para. 48.
45.
Paul Stephen Dempsey, Free Trade But Not Free Transport? The Mexican
Standoff, 30 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 91, 91 (2001).
46.
See, e.g., CAL. AIR EMISSIONS BD., NAFTAMEXICAN TRUCK EMISSIONS
OVERVIEW 2 (rev. 2005) (stating that as of 2005, 3,500 Mexican trucks entered
California commercial zones per day).
47.
See, e.g., Trucks Across the Border: Direct Shipping Between the U.S. and
Mexico Stirs Heated Debate, KNOWLEDGE @ W.P. CAREY, Sept. 26, 2007,
http://knowledge.wpcarey.asu.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1475
[hereinafter
Trucks
Across the Border] ("[T]he process generates pollution, raises costs for shipping
companies and exasperates producers and retailers.").
48.
See id. (stating that once the Mexican vehicle leaves a shipment at the
border, "[t]he goods are then picked up by drayage companies that specialize in the
time-consuming hop across the border and through U.S. Customs"); Meredith
Vesledahl, Economic Implications of the Bush Demonstration Project on Cross-Border
Trade Between the U.S. and Mexico, 14 LAW & BUS. R. AM. 631, 636 (2008) (elaborating
on the "drayage" process).
49.
Dempsey, supra note 45, at 92 ("Mexican carriers would deliver trailers to
U.S.-based long-haul trucks, which slowed the movement of goods and increased
transportation costs."); Vesledahl, supra note 48, at 636-37 (explaining that a Mexican
truck delivers the goods to a U.S. long-haul carrier at the drayage yard, then returns to
Mexico empty). In most cases, rather than physically transferring the goods from one
truck to another, the goods remain in one trailer and the trucks alternate hauling the
trailer. See id. at 636 (describing this process of "shuttl[ing]" the same trailer). In the
NAFTA arbitration panel proceedings, the U.S. claimed they were not worried about
the trailers from Mexico being pulled by U.S. trucks in the U.S. because eighty to
ninety percent of these trailers were U.S. owned. NAFTA Final Report, supra note 31,
para. 180.
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cumbersome process has been nicknamed "the slow dance of the three
trucks. ' 50 The criticism of this inefficient mode of transporting goods,
along with the United States' frustration that Mexico continued an
absolute ban on U.S. motor carriers, contributed to the inclusion of
51
cross-border trucking provisions in NAFTA.
B. Creation of NAFTA and Cross-BorderTrucking Obligations
In 1990, the U.S., Canada, and Mexico began negotiations to
create the North American Free Trade Agreement. 52 On December
17, 1992, the three countries agreed to a treaty that would reduce and
remove tariffs and grant "Most-Favored-Nation Treatment" and
"National Treatment" status to each country. 53
The Treaty
specifically addressed the ability of motor carriers to cross the U.S.Mexico border, but it did not address motor carriers crossing the
Canada-U.S. border because this had been occurring without
problems for over a decade. 54 Ironically, it was the U.S. delegation
that sought to include a U.S.-Mexico cross-border trucking
55
provision.
The Treaty laid out a two-stage plan to open the border to motor
carriers. In the first stage, which was to start on December 18, 1995,
the U.S. would allow Mexican motor carriers into the four U.S.
bordering states-California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas-and
Mexico would allow U.S. motor carriers into Mexico's six border
states. 56 The second stage was to begin on January 1, 2000, after
which motor carriers from the U.S. would be entitled to travel

50.
51.
52.

Trucks Across the Border, supra note 47.
Dempsey, supra note 45, at 92.
Earl H. Fry, The North American Free Trade Agreement: U.S. and

Canadian Perspectives, in

IMPLICATIONS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN

FREE TRADE

REGION: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 18 (Joseph A. McKinney & M. Rebecca
Sharpless eds., 1992) (describing how the free-trade agreement was first discussed
between President George H. W. Bush and President Carlos Salinas de Gortari from
Mexico, and that Brian Mulroney from Canada later also entered into the talks).
53.
Maryse Robert, Free Trade Agreements, in TOWARD FREE TRADE IN THE
AMERICAS 87, 90 (Jos6 M. Salazar-Xirinachs & Maryse Robert eds., 2001).
54.
Cf. ALICE ADAMS, TRUCKING GUIDE TO BORDER CROSSING: A NAFTA
GUIDEBOOK FOR NORTH AMERICAN TRUCKERS 50 (2004) ("NAFTA permits Mexican
trucking firms to provide cross-border delivery and the backhaul of cargo. Canadian
trucking companies operate in the United States under an agreement that was made
prior to NAFTA.").
55.
See Counter-Submission of the United States, In the Matter of Cross-Border
Trucking Services, at 3, Secretariat File No. USA-Mex-98-2008-01 (Feb. 23, 2000)
[hereinafter U.S. Counter-Submission] (on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law) ("During the negotiation of the NAFTA, the United States pressed
for a commitment by Mexico to phase out Mexican restrictions on cross-border trucking
services.").
56.
Dempsey, supra note 45, at 92.
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throughout Mexico, and Mexican motor carriers would be entitled to
57
travel throughout the U.S.
However, motor carriers never started crossing the border as
called for in the NAFTA provisions. On December 17, 1995, the day
before the first stage of the cross-border trucking was to begin,
President Clinton issued a surprising executive order that effectively
58
extended the moratorium on cross-border trucking with Mexico.
Although his official reason was that Mexican motor carriers were not
as safe as U.S. motor carriers and more time was needed to evaluate
the situation, many claim President Clinton ordered the delay in
order to appease the U.S. trucking industry.59
The Mexican
government responded by initiating NAFTA's Chapter 20 dispute
resolution mechanism. 60
Eventually, an arbitration panel was
formed to evaluate Mexico's complaint alleging that the U.S. was
61
violating NAFTA.
In 2001, the arbitration panel unanimously concluded that the
U.S. violated NAFTA by refusing to allow Mexican motor carriers into
the four U.S. border states as required by the Treaty. The panel
condemned the "blanket refusal" to consider Mexican motor carriers
for licensing6 2 and authorized Mexico to impose economic sanctions
on the U.S.6 3 However, the newly elected President George W. Bush
promised to promptly begin admitting Mexican motor carriers into
the U.S., satisfying the Mexican government, which chose not to
64
impose retaliatory tariffs at that time.

57.
Id.
58.
Id. at 93.
59.
Id; see also Andrews et al., supra note 2, at 635 ("Although concerns about
the safety of Mexican trucks and drivers were the rationale offered by the
Administration for its action, concerns by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
about losing work to allegedly lower paid Mexican drivers were the underlying cause
for this first violation of the NAFTA trucking provisions.").
60.
Dempsey, supra note 45, at 94; see also Blackmore, supra note 27, at 704.
Chapter twenty of NAFTA proscribes that disputes should be settled by following a
three-step process. See North American Free Trade Agreement pt. 7, ch. 20, § B, U.S.Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 693 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA Treaty] (providing
for dispute settlement procedures). First, the states in disagreement should consult. Id.
pt. 7, ch. 20, § B, art. 2006. If unsuccessful, the parties may seek mediation by the
NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC). Id. pt. 7, ch. 20, § B, art. 2006. Finally, the
complaining party may request an arbitration panel, as was requested by Mexico in
this instance. See NAFTA Final Report, supra note 31, para. 18-21 (after consultations
failed and the NAFTA FTC was unable to resolve the dispute, Mexico requested the
formation of an arbitral panel).
61.
NAFTA Final Report, supra note 31, paras. 22-23.
62.
Blackmore, supra note 27, at 708 (citing NAFTA Final Report, supra note
31, para. 295).
63.
Katharine G. Shirey, International Implications: The Elephant in the
Living Room in Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation, 34 ENVTL. L. 961, 981
(2004).
64.
Blackmore, supra note 27, at 709-10; see also Andrews et al., supra note 2,
at 635 ('The panel decision opened the door for Mexico to seek reparations against the
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Despite President Bush's announcement that the U.S. would
comply with the NAFTA arbitration panel's decision and allow
Mexican motor carriers into the U.S. by January 1, 2002,65 his
administration came nowhere near reaching this goal. In fact, the
NAFTA cross-border trucking provisions became a divisive issue,
particularly between the President and Congress, and the Bush
administration experienced little success in bringing the U.S. closer
to complying with NAFTA before the end of his presidency.
C. CongressionalActs to Stop Cross-BorderTrucking
Congress was closely involved in the cross-border trucking
debate during the Bush administration.
Although Congress
ultimately urged President Bush to end the Demonstration Project
and keep Mexican motor carriers off U.S. roads, the legislative branch
was not as vehemently opposed to cross-border trucking during the
early years of the Bush administration. Instead, after President
Bush announced that the U.S. would comply with the NAFTA crossborder trucking requirement in 2001, Congress engaged in discussion
66
with the administration but resisted hurried action.
On July 18, 2001, the Subcommittee on Highway and Transit
(the Subcommittee) held a hearing where Subcommittee members
expressed their concerns that the Mexican motor carriers would not
be safe enough to enter the U.S. because the Mexican safety
standards applicable to motor carriers were inferior to U.S. safety
standards. 67 The members of the Subcommittee also expressed
concerns about illegal drugs and immigrants being transported by the
motor carriers. 68 Norman Mineta, the Secretary of Transportation,
argued that the Department of Transportation (DOT) policy requiring
photo identification, insurance, and a vehicle inspection for all
Mexican motor carriers that crossed the border was sufficient to
safeguard the U.S. 69 Nevertheless, the Secretary was unable to
convince the Subcommittee that Mexican trucks would meet the

U.S. To date, Mexico has not yet walked through that door."). Some speculate that the
sanctions could have amounted to $200 billion. Dempsey, supra note 45, at 94-95.
65.
Blackmore, supra note 27, at 709. President Bush originally wanted to
allow the motor carriers to begin entering the U.S. by September 2001, but the
Secretary of Transportation said that would be an impossible timeframe. NAFTA:
Arbitration Panel Decision and Opening of the U.S.-Mexican Border to Mexican Motor
Carriers:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Highways and Transit of the H. Comm. on
Transportation and Infrastructure, 107th Cong. 35 (2001) (statement of Norman Y.
Mineta, Secretary of Transportation), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/
committees/trans/hpwl07-35.000[hpwlO7-35_0f.htm
[hereinafter Arbitration Panel
Decisions Hearing].
66.
See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
67.
ArbitrationPanel Decisions Hearing,supra note 65.
68.
Id. at 27, 46-47.
69.
Id. at 28, 30 (statement of Secretary Mineta).
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United States' safety standards, and the House of Representatives
denied any funding to the program in the "Sabo Amendment. '70 A
congressman mockingly said to the Secretary: "You can only do what
we give you money to do."' 71 Little did this congressman know, the
Bush administration would later defy this view by continuing a
program after Congress displayed a clear intent to stop the funding. 72
Later in 2001, Congress took further action by passing Section
350, which imposed twenty-two requirements that the DOT had to
fulfill before granting any Mexican motor carrier a license to operate
in the U.S. beyond the "commercial zone."'73 One of the most onerous
requirements of Section 350 was that all Mexican motor carriers had
to be physically inspected in Mexico by U.S. inspectors before
74
qualifying for a U.S. operating license.
In an effort to comply with Section 350, the DOT began talks
with Mexico about conducting inspections in Mexico. 75 Although
Mexico was originally uncertain about the idea, it finally conceded to
the plan in 2006.76 Once again, the DOT began moving forward with
plans to open the border to some Mexican-domiciled motor carriers. 77
In addition to the delays caused by Congress, other regulatory
issues complicated and delayed cross-border trucking programs. For
example, after the DOT initiated rulemaking to regulate the
Mexican-domiciled motor carriers, a group of environmentalists and
labor groups collectively filed a lawsuit claiming that the DOT
regulations were "arbitrary and capricious" because they did not
prepare full environmental impact statements as required by the

70.
Id. at 29. Although this legislation arguably brought the U.S. back in
violation of NAFTA, id. at 23 (statement of Peter F. Allgeier, Deputy U.S. Trade Rep.),
the members of Congress argued that the safety of the U.S. was a greater concern than
the treaty. See, e.g., id. at 15 (statement of Rep. Robert A. Borski) ("In carrying out our
treaty obligations, we must guarantee that we do so in a matter [sic] that assures the
safety of the United States citizens."). One concerned House member later stated that,
"NAFTA is a trade agreement; it is not a suicide pact." 147 CONG. REC. H3,587 (daily
ed. June 26, 2001) (statement of Rep. Obey).
71.
ArbitrationPanel Decisions Hearing,supra note 65, at 32.
72.
See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
73.
See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 350, 115 Stat. 864 (listing requirements). For a
chronological summary of these events, see Mexican Border and DOT Pilot Program
Project Chronology, http://www.trucksafety.org/docsMexican%20Border%20%20DOT%
20Pilot%20Program%20Chronology%2OUpdate%2OMarch%202008.doc
(last visited
Oct. 31, 2009).
74.
See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act § 350(a)(1)(A) (provision requiring "safety examination" prior to granting Mexican
motor carriers "conditional operating authority").
75.
Brent E. Butzin, The Effects of Transportation Regulation on the
Transborder Metropolitan Areas of the U.S.-Mexico Border Region: NAFTA and the
Mexican Truck Plan-Where Do We Go From Here?, 34 TRANSP. L.J. 391, 409 (2007).
76.
See id. at 408-09 (discussing opposition to the proposed safety rules by
Mexico's trucking lobby).
77.
Id. at 409-10.
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Clean Air Act (CAA). 78 The case went all the way to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which held that the DOT was not required to
evaluate the environmental effects of allowing Mexican motor
79
carriers to operate on U.S. roads.

Finally, on Feb. 23, 2007, the newly appointed Secretary of
Transportation, Mary Peters, announced that the U.S. and Mexico
would engage in a "Demonstration Project" that would allow 100
approved Mexican-domiciled motor carriers into the U.S. within 60
days. 80 The plan also included a grant of "reciprocal rights" for U.S.
domiciled motor carriers to enter Mexico. 8 '
The Subcommittee
convened to discuss the Demonstration Project, but there was a
noticeable difference in how the new Democrat-controlled Congress
approached the cross-border trucking issue. Unlike the congressmen
in the 2001 meeting, whose concerns focused on the safety of the
Mexican motor carriers on U.S. roads, congressmen in 2007 argued
against implementing any cross-border trucking programs because

they believed NAFTA was ineffective overall and would hurt their
constituents. 82
The opening remarks by Peter DeFazio, the
Subcommittee Chairman, illustrate the views of several of the
committee members:
[This is a way to displace American labor.... [W]hat I see as the grand
vision here is that we will develop ports in Mexico, the junk will be
made in China, shipped there, we can avoid the longshoreman's union
and not pay a living wage to people unloading the ships. Then we can
load it onto trucks that will drive it from there into the U.S. with
workers who are again not paid a living wage and may have a host of
83
other problems inherent in that.

Other members of Congress argued that the U.S. should only allow
the same number of Mexican motor carriers into the U.S. as the
number of U.S. motor carriers

that enter Mexico. 84

Although

78.
Blackmore, supra note 27, at 714-15.
79.
Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 773 (2004); McClintock,
supra note 2, at 36.
80.
McClintock, supra note 2, at 38.
81.
Demonstration Project on NAFTA Trucking Provisions Notice, 72 Fed. Reg.
23,884 (May 1, 2007).
82.
See, e.g., U.S./Mexican Trucking: Safety and the Cross-Border
Demonstration Project: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Highways and Transit of the
H. Comm. on Transportationand Infrastructure, 110th Cong. 2-3 (2007) [hereinafter
U.S./Mexican Trucking Hearing] (statement of Rep. John J. Duncan, Jr.) ("I am
concerned that treaties like NAFTA essentially want to do away with our borders and
with Mexico and Canada and merge us into a North American Union. I am greatly
opposed to this and want to protect U.S. political and economic sovereignty.").
83.
Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Peter DeFazio).
84.
E.g., id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Duncan) ("[W]e should let one Mexican
trucking company in for every American trucking company that wants to go and gets
permission to go into Mexico."). Because this hearing made clear that only two U.S.
companies had expressed interest in operating in Mexico, id., implementing this policy
would effectively eliminate the Mexican motor carriers' authority to operate in the U.S.
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concerns regarding reciprocity and the wage difference between the
U.S. and Mexico were valid, the Subcommittee no longer considered
how to safely implement a cross-border trucking program; instead, it
worked to justify why it would not support the Demonstration Project
or other similar cross-border trucking programs.
Later in 2007, the House adopted an amendment to the Fiscal
Year 2008 Transportation, Treasury, Housing, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act to strip funding from the Demonstration Project.
The Act provided that, "[n]one of the funds made available under this
Act may be used to establish a cross-border motor carrier
demonstration program to allow Mexico-domiciled motor carriers to
operate beyond the commercial zones along the international border
between the U.S. and Mexico."8 5 The bill passed both the House and
the Senate with large margins but was not presented to the
President.8 6 In a Statement of Administration Policy, the Bush
administration clarified that the President would veto the bill if it
was placed before the President because "the Administration . . .
strongly [opposes] any amendment that is intended to delay or
87
restrict the [Demonstration Project]."
Congress made two more attempts to stop the Demonstration
Project in 2007. First, it added a provision in the U.S. Troop
Remedies, Veterans Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability
88
Appropriations Act that would eliminate funding for the program.
The President vetoed the bill, and Congress failed to override the
veto.8 9 Second, on December 26, 2007, after the Demonstration
Project had already been initiated, Congress passed a Consolidated
Appropriation Act with the "Dorgan Amendment," which prohibited
the DOT from using funds to "establish a cross-border motor carrier
demonstration program."90 The President signed the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, but the DOT continued the Demonstration
Project because the Department "believed" that the legislation only

H.R. REP. No. 110-497, at 556 (2007); see also Govtrack.us, H.R. 3074:
85.
Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2008, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl10-3074
(last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (providing a summary of the bill and the votes in the House
and Senate) [hereinafter Govtrack.us, H.R. 3074]
86.
Govtrack.us, H.R. 3074, supra note 85.
87.
153 CONG. REC. H8,246 (statement of Rep. Sessions reading the Statement
of Administration Policy into the record).
88.
Govtrack.us, H.R. 1591: U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina
Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, http://www.govtrack.us
/congress/vote.xpd?vote=s2007-126 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
89.
Id.
90.
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, H.R. 2764, 110th Cong. § 136
(enacted) ("None of the funds made available under this Act may be used to establish a
cross-border motor carrier demonstration program to allow Mexico-domiciled motor
carriers to operate beyond the commercial zones along the international border
between the U.S. and Mexico.").
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prohibited the Department from establishing a new Demonstration
Project. 91 However, the text and legislative history surrounding the
Dorgan Amendment demonstrate that the Bush administration's
creative interpretation of the amendment was at odds with
congressional intent.
D. The True Meaning of the DorganAmendment
Congress made its biggest push to stop the cross-border trucking
program with the Dorgan Amendment included in the 2008
Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act. Senator Dorgan of North Dakota, along
with six other senators, including Senator Obama and Senator
Clinton, sponsored the Amendment, which stated: "None of the funds
made available under this Act may be used to establish a cross-border
motor carrier demonstration program to allow Mexico-domiciled
motor carriers to operate beyond the commercial zones along the
international border between the U.S. and Mexico. '9 2
This
amendment easily passed the Senate, with 75 senators supporting
the amendment, 23 voting against it, and 2 abstaining. 93 While the
Act never became law, the Dorgan Amendment was enacted through
a large omnibus bill, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, which was
94
signed by President Bush.
Nevertheless, the DOT continued the Demonstration Project
because, in its view, the Consolidated Appropriations Act only
prohibited the Department from establishing a new Demonstration
Project; it did not mandate stopping the Demonstration Project that
was already in practice. 95 One could argue that interpreting the Act
with a strict textual analysis leads to this conclusion, but the
legislative history and implicit purpose behind the provision help
demonstrate that Congress intended to stop the current
Demonstration Project in addition to preventing the DOT from
establishing future Demonstration Projects. 96 A review of Senator

91.
See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
92.
Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2008, H.R. 3074, 110th Cong. (2007) (as passed by Senate, Sept.
11, 2007).
93.
Govtrack.us, S. Amdt. 2797: To Prohibit the Establishment of a Program
that... to H.R. 3074 [110th]: Transportation, Housing and... (Vote on Amendment),
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=s2007-331 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
94.
Ams. for Legal Immigration, Senator Thrashes Bush's Mexican Truck Hat
Dance, http://www.alipac.us/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3032
(last
visited Oct. 31, 2009).
95.
U.S. Moves Ahead With Mexican Truck Program: White House Defies
Congress, Pointing to Loophole in New Law, MSNBC, Jan. 4, 2008,
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az--view-all&address=10
2x3125132 [hereinafter White House Defies Congress].
96.
See infra text accompanying notes 97-106.
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Dorgan's supporting statements, Senator Cornyn's statements in
opposition, and President Bush's memorandum demonstrates that
the statute, despite poor drafting, was intended to stop the current
Demonstration Project.
During the floor debates on the Dorgan Amendment, Senator
Dorgan stated that he did not think the Senate "ought to allow, at
this point, the pilot project to go forward that will have long-haul
Mexican trucks coming into this country now," and he thus urged the
other senators to adopt his amendment. 97 Later in the debate,
Senator Dorgan summarized what he hoped to achieve: "I hope by
passing my amendment we will say to the DOT that they may not go
forward with this pilot project because this is an issue of safety and
we stand for safety in this country. '98 In both of these statements,
the Senator showed that he intended his amendment to stop the DOT
from allowing Mexican trucks into the country under the existing
Demonstration Project.
As floor statements can be abused in hopes of slanting
subsequent interpretation of a law, it is important also to consider the
statements of Senator Cornyn, who opposed the bill.
Senator
Cornyn's statements demonstrate that he also
believed the Dorgan Amendment would proscribe the current
Demonstration Project. He argued that "instead of trying to kill this
program, which will violate the treaty obligations of the U.S. as
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court and international arbitration
panels, [Congress has] a duty to find workable solutions that ensure
as much as humanly possible the safety of trucks on our roads. .... 99
Clearly, Senator Cornyn believed and feared that the Dorgan
Amendment would stop the existing DOT Demonstration Project.
Indeed, he would have been relieved if the amendment's only goal
were to stop future Demonstration Projects because that would
neither "kill" any program, nor place the U.S. in violation of its
NAFTA obligations.10 0
Finally, after the Dorgan Amendment was approved by Congress
and placed in the 2008 Transportation, Housing and Urban
Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, the Bush
administration issued a Statement of Administration Policy.' 0 1 In
this statement, the Bush administration threatened to veto the bill if
presented to the President in its current form.' 0 2
Among the

97.
153 CONG. REC. S11,388 (statement of Sen. Dorgan) (emphasis added).
98.
Id. at S11,393.
99.
Id. at S11,390 (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
100.
Id.
101.
153 CONG. REC. H8,246 (statement of Rep. Sessions reading the Statement
of Administration Policy into the record).
102.
Id.
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concerns was the Dorgan Amendment.1 0 3
The administration
cautioned that it "would strongly oppose any amendment that is
intended to delay or restrict the Demonstration Project."'1 4 This
statement demonstrates the administration's fear that Congress was
trying to shut down the Demonstration Project. There is no rational
reason why the administration would fear Congress preventing a
future Demonstration Project, because the administration had the
ability to extend the current Demonstration Project indefinitely. 105
As a result, the Bush administration's later interpretation that the
Dorgan Amendment only stopped the DOT from "establishing" a
Demonstration Project seems inconsistent with the view the
06
administration had when threatening to veto the bill.'
In summary, this Note suggests that the most natural
interpretation of the Dorgan Amendment, and the interpretation that
both the legislative and executive branches had at the time the
amendment was written, was that the Secretary of Transportation
could not use funds allocated by Congress to continue the
Demonstration Project or to establish a new program. Although the
Bush administration's creative interpretation kept the Demonstration
Project alive through the end of President Bush's presidency,
President Obama's administration wasted little time in terminating
07
the Demonstration Project.'
E. The Bush Administration'sDemonstrationProject
In September 2008, select Mexican eighteen-wheeler trucks were
permitted to cross the border into the U.S. in order to make deliveries
in Chicago, Illinois. l0 8
The U.S. granted these motor carriers
permission as part of a DOT Demonstration Project initiated to bring
the U.S. closer to compliance with NAFTA requirements. 10 9 Although
only a small number of Mexican motor carriers were allowed into the
U.S. as part of this year-long Demonstration Project, there was
significant outcry against the program and the possibility that many
more Mexican trucks and drivers could soon be on U.S. freeways. 110

103.
Id.
104.
Id.
105.
White House Defies Congress, supra note 95.
106.
Id.
107.
See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
108.
Oscar Avila, Mexican Trucks Ready to Roll: A Demonstration Project to
Allow the Haulers Anywhere in the U.S.-And Vice Versa-Is Stoking New Debates
Over NAFTA on Both Sides of the Border, CH. TRIB., Sept. 8, 2007,
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2007/sep/08/news/chi-trucks-avilasepO8.
109.
U.S./Mexican Trucking Hearing,supra note 82, at 4 (statement by John
Hill).
110.
Vesledahl, supra note 48, at 632; see also, e.g., Don't Open U.S. Highways to
Mexico-Domiciled Trucks Under Fake Pilot Project, Public Citizen Urges Congress,
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The U.S. Brotherhood of Teamsters, a union of U.S. truck drivers and
a strong supporter of President Obama, insisted that allowing
Mexican motor carriers into the U.S. would take jobs from U.S. truck
drivers because the Mexican drivers' salaries are much lower.11 1
Because of the souring public opinion of NAFTA, particularly the
provisions requiring the U.S. to allow Mexican motor carriers to cross
the border into the U.S., Congress tried but was unable to stop the
Demonstration Project during the Bush administration. 11 2 Once
President Obama took office, Congress and the Executive branch
united in opposition to the Demonstration Project and cross-border
trucking. In addition to opposing the Demonstration Project for
political reasons, President Obama and the Democratic Congress
likely resented the program because President Bush had cunningly
kept it alive despite clear congressional intent to shut it down. 113 The
Obama-Congress alliance took definitive action on March 11, 2009,
by cutting the funding to the Demonstration Project, thereby stopping
all progress the U.S. and Mexico had made on the issue of crossborder trucking. 114 This time, the amendment was explicit in its
intent to terminate the existing program:
None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available under this
Act may be used, directly or indirectly, to establish, implement,
continue, promote, or in any way permit a cross-border motor carrier
demonstration program to allow Mexican-domiciled motor carriers to
operate beyond the commercial zones along the international border
between the U.S. and Mexico, including continuing, in whole or in part,
any such program that was initiated prior to the date of the enactment
115
of this Act.

Unfortunately, this U.S. action negatively affected U.S. relations
with Mexico and could further deteriorate the challenging economic
climate Americans currently face. Moreover, as will be further

PUBLIC CITIZEN, Mar. 8, 2007, http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=2392
(lobbying for the termination of the Demonstration Project).
111.
E.g., The Incomparble [sic] Chuck Mack Speaks, WM and Graniterock,
http://www.teamster.net/index.php?autocom=blog&blogid=3 (May 8, 2008, 21:37 EST)
("To say American truckers are at a competitive disadvantage economically states the
obvious. Mexican drivers will be lucky if they receive the U.S. minimum wage.").
112.
See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
113.
Cf. Dave Montgomery, Mexican Trucks Allowed Deep into U.S. in Defiance
of Congress, Lawmaker Says, McCLATCHY, Jan. 3, 2008, http://www.mcclatchydc.com
100/story/24166.html.
Sen. Byron Dorgan... scoffed at [the DOT's] interpretation and called on the
Bush administration to end the program immediately. 'The DOT response is
both arrogant and wrong!' Dorgan wrote. 'The Department of Transportation is
making a serious mistake if it believes it is not required to abide by this
legislation.'
114.
115.

Barrera & Palmer, supra note 1.
Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 136, 123 Stat. 524 (2009).
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established below, terminating the Demonstration Project represents
the clearest violation of NAFTA's cross-border trucking provisions
that has occurred since NAFTA's creation.
III. DEFINING

U.S. OBLIGATIONS UNDER

NAFTA

A. Looking at the Text of NAFTA
Many of the obligations under NAFTA depend on the principles
of "National Treatment" and "Most-Favored-Nation Treatment." With
regards to the cross-border trucking obligations, the U.S. committed
itself to extend the same privileges to Mexican motor carriers as it
grants to U.S. motor carriers (national treatment) and to Canadian
116
motor carriers (most-favored-nation treatment).
The following NAFTA articles establish the requirements of
national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment with regards
to service providers of other NAFTA countries:
Article 1202: National Treatment
(1) Each Party shall accord to service providers of another Party
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances,
to its own service providers ...
Article 1203: Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
Each Party shall accord to service providers of another Party treatment
no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to service
providers of any other Party or of a non-Party.
Article 1204: Standard of Treatment
Each Party shall accord to service providers of any other Party the
better of the treatment required by Articles 1202 and 1203.117

Articles 1202, 1203, and 1204 require the members of NAFTA to
treat each other's service providers no worse than they treat their
own-or other members'-service providers. 118 Although this chapter
of NAFTA did not specially mention the trucking industry, the
definition of "service provider" given in Article 1213 is so broad that
truck drivers could easily qualify as "service providers." 119 Thus, it
seems that the U.S. has been in almost constant violation of NAFTA
Articles 1202 and 1203 because both U.S. and Canadian motor
carriers have been allowed to operate in the U.S. while Mexican

116.
NAFTA Final Report, supranote 31, para. 247.
117.
NAFTA Treaty, supra note 60, arts. 1202-04.
118.
Id.
119.
Id. art. 1213 ("[Slervice provider of a Party means a person of a Party that
seeks to provide or provides a service ....
");see also NAFTA Final Report, supra note
31, para. 252 ("Given [the NAFTA] definitions, the Panel considered the undisputed
facts in the record that the essential service in question involves the commercial
transportation of goods from Mexico to points in the United States by service providers
of Mexico.").
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motor carriers have not. Indeed, Mexico relied heavily on this
120
straightforward argument before the NAFTA arbitration panel.
However, this simplistic argument overlooks a limited exception
found in Article 2101 as well as the extremely debated phrase "like
circumstances" in Articles 1202 and 1203. Article 2101 provides an
exception to the national treatment and most-favored-nation
treatment obligations discussed above. 12 1
Under this Article,
Member States are given some leeway to adopt or enforce "measures
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those
relating to health and safety and consumer protection."'1 2 2 Thus, a
NAFTA party could treat other NAFTA members' service providers
less favorably than required by national treatment or most-favorednation treatment as long as the measures chosen are "necessary to
secure compliance" with a proper law or regulation. 123 However, a
NAFTA party cannot use the flexibility provided by this article to
engage in "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail" or as a "disguised
'124
restriction on trade between the Parties.
Many free trade agreements include provisions similar to Article
2101 in order to grant each country some flexibility to run the country
125
as needed, even if doing so conflicts with a treaty obligation.
However, one of the main limiting factors of these provisions is that
the measures chosen have to be "necessary" to achieve compliance
with the law. If a country chooses a method out of convenience or
because that method is the most cost-effective, this article will likely
not apply.

120.

See Initial Submission, In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services,

para. 188, Secretariat File No. USA-Mex-98-2008-01 [hereinafter NAFTA Initial
Mexican Submission] ('[filagging' of all Mexican carriers is a denial of national
treatment, because domestic carriers are entitled under U.S. law to both (i)
consideration on their individual merits and (ii) a full opportunity to contest the denial
of operating authority.").
121.
NAFTA Treaty, supra note 60, art. 2101.
122.
Id.
Provided that such measures are not applied in a manner that would constitute
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on trade between the
Parties, nothing in . . . Chapter Twelve (Cross-Border Trade in Services) ...
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Party of
measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to
health and safety and consumer protection.

Id.
123.
124.
125.

See id.
Id.
NAFTA Final Report, supra note 31, paras. 260, 263-64.
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In addition, the three words "in like circumstances" found in
Articles 1202 and 1203 also limit the national treatment and mostfavored-nation
treatment
obligations.1 26
Presumably,
if
"circumstances" differed, a member state could treat another
country's service providers less favorably without violating either
Article 1202 or 1203. The exact meaning of this phrase, and its
applicability to the U.S. cross-border trucking obligations, was an
issue of enormous debate before the NAFTA arbitration panel and
127
will be discussed more fully below.
Although the parties to NAFTA agreed that the Treaty would
enter into force on January 1, 1994,128 the parties delayed the
implementation of the cross-border trucking requirements. The U.S.
reservation stated that "[a] person of Mexico will be permitted to
obtain operating authority to provide ...

Cross-Border truck services

to or from border states (California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas)"
by December 18, 1995, and cross-border truck services to the entire
U.S. by January 1, 2000.129 The Mexican reservation paralleled the
U.S. reservation; this phase-out provided that cross-border trucking
would commence to Mexico's border states by December 18, 1995, and
to all of Mexico by January 1, 2000.130 Because of the reservations,
the U.S. had no obligation to allow Mexican motor carriers beyond the
commercial zones of the U.S. before December 1995. However, this
date came and went without the U.S. allowing Mexican motor
carriers to go beyond the commercial zones. 131 In response, Mexico
l3 2
brought the dispute to a NAFTA arbitration panel.
B. NAFTA ArbitrationPanel Holds U.S. in Violation of NAFTA
Because there was no disagreement that the U.S. had extended
the moratorium against cross-border trucking, the principal issue for
the arbitration panel was to determine whether this action was
consistent with the parties' obligations under NAFTA. 133 The crux of
the debate centered on the meaning of the words "like circumstances."

126.
NAFTA Treaty, supra note 60, arts. 1202-03.
127.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
128.
NAFTA Treaty, supranote 60, art. 1019.
129.
Blackmore, supra note 27, at 702.
130.
Id. Annex II at 752 (Schedule of Mexico).
131.
Barry E. Prentice & Mark Ojah, NAFTA in the Next Ten Years: Issues and
Challenges in Transportation (May 24-25, 2001) (unpublished paper presented at
NAFTA in the New Millennium Symposium, Univ. of Alberta, 2001), available at
http://apps.business.ualberta.ca/wcer/pdf/NAFTAPrentice.pdf.
132.
Dempsey, supranote 45, at 93-94.
133.
Cf. NAFTA Final Report, supra note 31, para. 214 (noting that "[the panel]
confines its analysis to the consistency or inconsistency of" the United States'
continuation of its moratorium on cross-border trucking.).
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The U.S. argued that the trucking regulatory system in each of
the three NAFTA countries was a "critical" circumstance relating to
cross-border trucking. 134
Because Mexico lacked regulations
regarding drivers' hours, use of logbooks, commercial motor vehicle
(CMV) safety equipment, and out-of-service rates, the U.S. believed
that Mexican motor carrier circumstances were fundamentally unlike
the circumstances of U.S. and Canadian motor carriers. 135 Following
this logic, affording Mexican motor carriers fewer privileges than U.S.
and Canadian motor carriers did not violate NAFTA because the less
favorable treatment occurred because of different circumstances.
Mexico rejected the U.S. argument, and declared that the U.S.
decision to continue the moratorium on cross-border trucking was
motivated by politics, effectively imposing an "economic embargo on
Mexico. ' 13 6 Alternatively, Mexico argued that "even if the U.S.
government actually were motivated by concerns over safety and
security, it [had] not proceeded in the appropriate manner,"1137
because the decision to deny any Mexican trucking firm, regardless of
its individual qualifications, an application to operate in the U.S. was
a violation of the national treatment and most-favored-nation
treatment obligations under NAFTA. 138 Specifically, Mexico argued
that the U.S. considered domestic motor carriers on their individual
merits, and owners of these motor carriers have the privilege to
contest the denial of operating authority; however, the U.S. did not
extend either of these rights to motor carriers owned or operated by
Mexicans. 139 Neither of the parties intended a "blanket exception" to
the national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment during
negotiations, and more fundamentally, reading the nationality of a
trucking company as constituting unlike circumstances would deprive
the national treatment clauses of any force. 140
The Mexican
government acknowledged that different circumstances in the
Mexican regulatory framework may support some difference in
treatment but demanded that any distinction in treatment occur on a
case-by-case basis, rather than as a default blanket ban on Mexican
14 1
motor carriers.
The U.S. responded that a case-by-case, or "[a] carrier-by-carrier
approach ...cannot effectively ensure safety compliance by Mexican
motor carriers operating in the U.S." because Mexico does not have a

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

U.S. Counter-Submission, supra note 55, at 43.
Id. at 43-44.
NAFTA Final Report, supra note 31, paras. 149-51.
Id. para. 116.
NAFTA Initial Mexican Submission, supra note 120, para. 196.
Id. para. 188.
Id. para. 124.
NAFTA Final Report, supra note 31, para. 123.
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"comprehensive, integrated safety regime."'1 42 Essentially, the U.S.
argued that it would be fruitless to seek to establish whether an
applicant was a safe driver when the Mexican government did not
143
maintain records of driver performance.
Canada chose to participate in the arbitration panel, as allowed
by Article 2013 of NAFTA, 144 and for the most part agreed with
Mexico. 145 According to Canada, "[a] blanket refusal to permit a
person of Mexico to obtain operating authority to provide cross-border
truck services . . . would, on its face, be less favorable than the

treatment

accorded

circumstances."'

146

to

U.S.

truck

service

providers

in

like

In establishing the proper interpretation of "like circumstances,"
and Articles 1202, 1203, and 1204, the NAFTA arbitration panel
specifically declined to examine the United States' motivation for
continuing the moratorium on cross-border trucking. 14 7 Instead, the
panel focused on the text of the delayed implementation provisions in
the reservation section, as well as on Articles 1202 and 1203.148
First, the panel held that the delayed implementation requirement
was not conditional, and thus was mandatory on the U.S. unless some
other article in NAFTA provided an exception. 149 Second, the panel
addressed the proper interpretation of "like circumstances" in Articles
1202 and 1203. The arbitration body concluded that "there is no
legally sufficient basis for interpreting 'like circumstances' as
permitting a blanket moratorium on all Mexican trucking firms,"
150
therefore concluding that the action by the U.S. violated NAFTA.

142.
Id. para. 155.
143.
See id. paras. 156-57, 171 (stating that Mexico's database does not contain
safety information and that it would be futile to track drivers since they are not
required to carry records for inspection).
144.
NAFTA Treaty, supra note 60, art. 2013.
145.
NAFTA Final Report, supra note 31, para. 196.
146.
Id.
147.
Id. para. 214 ("The subjective intentions inhabiting the minds of individual
legislators or regulators do not bear upon the inquiry, if only because they are not
accessible to treaty interpreters.").
148.
Id. paras. 235, 278.
149.
Id. para. 235.
150. Id.para. 278. In addition to claiming the U.S. violated Articles 1202 and
1203 pertaining to cross-border trucking, the Mexican government also claimed that
the "[tihe U.S. has denied Mexican nationals the opportunity to invest in U.S. motor
carriers in violation of Articles 1102 and 1103." NAFTA Initial Mexican Submission,
supra note 120, pt. II.G. Articles 1102 and 1103 allowed Mexican citizens to invest in
U.S. trucking enterprises. See NAFTA Treaty, supra note 60, arts. 1102-03 (providing
for investors of "another Party"). Because these businesses would continue to be
operated by U.S. managers, drivers, and trucks, there is no safety concern to justify the
United States' failure to comply with these obligations. See id. at para. 197 ("The fact
that the United States also failed in the transportation sector as required by its
Schedule to Annex I further confirms that safety and security concerns had nothing to
do with the U.S. decision to refuse to implement its NAFTA obligations."). In the
findings section, the NAFTA arbitration panel concluded "that the U.S. was and
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Although the NAFTA arbitration panel found that the U.S. had
violated NAFTA and authorized Mexico to impose economic sanctions
on the U.S., 151 its "recommendations" clarified the NAFTA provisions
in a way that makes future U.S. compliance more attainable. While
the report explicitly stated that a "blanket" refusal to consider
Mexican motor carriers' applications violated NAFTA, it recognized
that a differing treatment of Mexican applications might be
permissible under NAFTA, as long as the Mexican motor carriers
were "reviewed on a case by case basis. ' 152 The panel even recognized
that, "to the extent that the inspection and licensing requirements for
Mexican trucks and drivers wishing to operate in the U.S. may not be
'like' those in place in the U.S., different methods of ensuring
compliance with the U.S. regulatory regime may be justifiable. '153
Because the inspection and licensing remain quite different
between Mexico and the U.S., the arbitration panel's decision opens
the door for the U.S. to implement a cross-border trucking program
that is consistent with NAFTA but responds adequately to the safety
concerns of the U.S. The proposal offered in Part TV suggests how
this can be accomplished.
C. Stopping the DemonstrationProject Violated NAFTA
President Bush's Demonstration Project arguably a violated
NAFTA's most-favored nation treatment provision because it did not
limit the number of Canadian trucks that could operate in the U.S.,
while it simultaneously imposed quotas on the number of licenses
granted to Mexican applicants. 154 Nevertheless, Mexico consented to
the Demonstration Project as part of a compromise agreement with
the U.S. 155 However, the U.S. broke the compromise when it
terminated the Demonstration Project in Spring of 2009.

remains in breach of its obligation under ...Article 1102 (national treatment), and
Article 1103 (most-favored-nation treatment) ....
" NAFTA Final Report, supra note
31, para. 297.

151.

Karen A. Lobdell, Mexico Announces Retaliatory Tariffs on U.S. Goods,

CLIENT ALERT (Drinker Biddle, Chicago, Ill.), Mar. 19, 2009, at 1, available at
http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/files/Publication/d7fb4b92-a3e7-4390-8fb707lf5a2c5cd9/PresentationPublicationAttachment/b55543d6-ed3e-4cd9-9ec8-0b 113733
0la2/MexicoRetaliatory.pdf.
152.
NAFTA Final Report, supra note 31, para. 300 ("The U.S. may not be
required to treat applications from Mexican trucking firms in exactly the same manner
as applications from U.S. or Canadian firms, as long as they are reviewed on a case by
case basis.").
153.
Id. para. 301.
154.
Avila, supra note 108.
155.
To read a statement from the Transportation Undersecretary of the
Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes (SCT) endorsing the Demonstration
Project, see Statement of Manuel Rodrigues Arregui, http://dgaf.sct.gob.mx/fileadmin
Piloto/Acuerdo-ingl.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
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Currently, no Mexican trucks are allowed to enter the U.S.
beyond the commercial zones. 156 This complete ban on Mexican
trucks creates the same situation as the Clinton era ban on Mexican
trucks, which gave rise to the NAFTA arbitration panel. Because the
arbitration panel decided that the Clinton-era ban violated the
national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment obligations
under NAFTA, it follows that the current ban also violates NAFTA.
Despite the evident violation of NAFTA by the U.S., some
congressmen have attempted to deny the violation or denounce
Mexican tariffs, rather than work towards compliance. For example,
Senator Peter Defazio, Chairman of Congress' Highway and Transit
Subcommittee, suggested that the tariffs are illegal "scare tactics"
and encouraged President Obama to "call Mexico's bluff' by
threatening to withhold U.S. aid to Mexico if Mexico does not
eliminate the tariffs. 157 However, the NAFTA arbitration panel in
2001 specifically authorized these tariffs, and Mexico patiently gave
the U.S. eight years in which to comply with NAFTA before finally
imposing the tariffs. 158 The delay in imposing the tariffs does not
make them any less legal under NAFTA. 159 Moreover, the Obama
administration has not given any indication that the administration
believes the Mexican tariffs are illegal or excessive. Instead, the
administration's statements implicitly acknowledge that the U.S. is
°
currently violating NAFTA's cross-border provisions.16

156.
White House Press Release, supra note 1.
157.
Letter from Peter DeFazio, U.S. Congressman, to President Barack Obama
(Mar. 20, 2009), available at http://www.defazio.house.gov/index.php?option=content&
task=view&id=464; see also Lou Dobbs Tonight: AIG Outrage; Economy Showdown;
Obama Overreaching; Credit Card Rip-off; Stealing Your Identity (CNN television
broadcast Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0903/
19/ldt.01.html (quoting Sen. Dorgan, who called the tariffs "an outrage" and argued,
"this is a country that has a nearly one-half trillion trade surplus with us over the last
ten years or we have a one-half trillion dollar trade deficit with them and they're
suggesting that we are somehow violating trade agreements or guilty of unfair trade").
158.
Barrera & Palmer, supra note 1.
Hutchinson, supra note 7 ("Mexico's tariffs on $2.4bn of US exports is both
159.
modest and permitted under the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement.").
160.
See Mexico City Press Conference, supra note 26 (implying that the U.S. is
not complying with NAFTA). In response to a question about NAFTA, President
Obama responded:
I know that there has been some concern about a provision that was placed in
our stimulus package related to Mexican trucking. That wasn't a provision that
my administration introduced, and I said at the time that we need to fix this
because the last thing we want to do at a time when the global economy is
contracting and trade is shrinking is to resort to protectionist measures.
Id.; see also White House Press Release, supra note 1 ('The President has tasked the
Department of Transportation to work with the U.S. Trade Representative and the
Department of State . . .to propose legislation creating a new trucking project that will
meet the legitimate concerns of Congress and our NAFTA commitments.").
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Other congressmen have argued that U.S. obligations under
NAFTA differ from obligations under a typical treaty because NAFTA
was ratified as a congressional-executive agreement rather than with
two-thirds consent of the U.S. Senate. 16 1 During the floor debate,
Senator Dorgan emphasized this distinction by arguing that "[t]here
is no treaty that requires us to open our borders to long-haul Mexican
trucking at this moment .. .. *"162 However, this view fails to
recognize that an international agreement that is signed by the
President carries international obligations regardless of how the
agreement is ratified. 163 As early as 1945, scholars wrote that
"[w]hile constitutional usage generally requires that the President
ratify treaties before they come into effect as the 'law of the land,' this
does not mean that any particular form of ratification must be
followed, nor does it condition the international effectiveness of a
treaty upon the prior completion of an act of ratification.' 1 64 Since
that time, many international treaties, such as the treaty that formed
the WTO, have been ratified in the U.S. by passing a majority of both
houses of Congress rather than achieving the two-thirds approval of
165
the Senate.
Senator Dorgan correctly stated that Congress could amend
NAFTA's application in the U.S. by passing another law that
supersedes the original international agreement. 166 However, despite
the ability of Congress to change the domestic application of the
international agreement, U.S. international obligations remain fixed
and cannot be modified by Congress. 167 Therefore, once Congress
stopped the Demonstration Project through domestic legislation, the
U.S. found itself violating NAFTA's international obligations, and
Mexico was within its rights to impose tariffs on U.S. imports.
IV.PROPOSAL
Up to this point, the U.S. positions on cross-border trucking have
consisted of a series of radical decisions, often along party lines, to

161.

MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION's TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 197

(2007).
162.
153 CONG. REC. S11,390 (statement by Sen. Dorgan) (emphasis added).
163.
Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, The Identical Legal Consequences of
Treaties and Executive Agreements, 54 YALE L.J. 307, 320 (1945).
164.
Id.
165.

JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 269 (2006).
166.
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
167.
See generally Memorandum from Christopher Schroeder, Acting Assistant
Attorney Gen., to Alan J. Kreczko, Special Assistant to the President and Legal
Advisor to the Nat'l Sec. Council, The Validity of Congressional-Executive Agreements
that Substantially Modify the United States' Obligations Under an Existing Treaty
(Nov. 25, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/treaty.top.htm (discussing limits
on the power of congress to modify international obligations).
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either stop cross-border trucking with Mexico or to allow it. The
Clinton administration abruptly shut the border to Mexican motor
carriers in 1995,168 whereas the Bush administration vowed to open
the border in 2001.169 Congress passed legislation that made opening
the border impracticable from 2001 to 2006,170 and the Bush
171
administration responded by initiating the Demonstration Project.
Finally, after several skirmishes over the interpretation of
congressional amendments, 1 72 Congress slammed the door on crossborder trucking on March 11, 2009.173 These extreme positions on
cross-border trucking have rallied great support from separate groups
of constituencies, 174 but they have not meaningfully moved the U.S.
towards rational, safe compliance with NAFTA cross-border trucking
obligations.
Going forward, the U.S. should commit itself to allowing crossborder trucking with Mexico and adopt a regulatory framework that
addresses the safety concerns associated with allowing Mexican
motor carriers to operate in the U.S. The Obama administration
should begin this process by restarting a cross-border pilot program
similar to the Bush administration's Demonstration Project. The
Obama administration can study the challenges and safety issues
that the pilot program presents and use this data when bringing U.S.
trucking policies into compliance with NAFTA's cross-border trucking
provisions.
Swift reinstatement of a cross-border trucking pilot
program will also benefit the U.S. economy because Mexico has
promised to cease the retaliatory tariffs if the U.S. once again
175
institutes a cross-border trucking pilot program.
Undoubtedly, allowing Mexican motor carriers to traverse U.S.
roadways, whether as part of the pilot program or in complete
compliance with NAFTA's obligations, will have some associated
safety concerns. These safety concerns can be categorized as either
"generic concerns" or "particularized concerns." The former category
recognizes the concerns that are germane to all motor carriers,

168.
Prentice & Ojah, supranote 131, at 9.
169.
See supra note 65.
170.
See discussion supra Part I.C.
171.
Avila, supra note 108.
172.
See discussion supra Part I.D.
173.
See Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 136, 123 Stat. 524
(2009) (cutting funding for any "demonstration program").
174.
See, e.g., Editorial, A Small and Dangerous Spat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,
2009, at A30 (warning that tit-for-tat protectionism could result in an even worse
economic slump and noting that the Teamsters union and its allies in congress are
using safety concerns as a pretext for protectionism); Public Citizen, supra note 24
(denouncing the Bush Administration's plan).
175.
See loan Grillo, Obama's Trade War' No Truck with Mexico, TIME, Mar. 25,
2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article0,85 9 9 ,1887494,00.html (quoting Mexican
Economy Secretary as promising to "eliminate all the tariffs" once the "United States
returns to its commitments').
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regardless of their country of origin. In contrast, the latter category
identifies safety concerns that are attributable specifically to Mexican
motor carriers. The following sections will provide examples of the
two types of concerns, as well as detail regulations that properly
address these concerns.
A. Generic Concerns
Many of the concerns with Mexican motor carriers are generic
concerns. For example, the speed at which a Mexican motor carrier
operates in the U.S. is not a safety concern relevant to Mexican motor
carriers only. Jurisdictions within the U.S. seek to enforce speed
limits for all trucks because speeding is a potential safety concern for
any motor carrier. Therefore, the regulations addressing the generic
concerns of Mexican motor carriers should be equivalent to the
regulations of U.S. motor carriers because the concern is shared for
both U.S. and Mexican motor carriers.
Responding to the generic concerns of Mexican motor carriers is
easy because the U.S. already has laws and regulations in place that
address these concerns. It is imperative to strongly reiterate that
Mexican motor carriers operating in the U.S. are fully subject to U.S.
trucking laws and regulations. 176 Therefore, the laws and regulations
in place regarding speed limits, freight weight limits, and insurance
apply automatically to Mexican motor carriers once they cross the
177
border into the U.S.
Some of the cross-border trucking opposition likely arose because
U.S. citizens do not understand that Mexican motor carriers will be
subject to U.S. laws and regulations while operating in the U.S. This
misconception probably stems from opponents of cross-border
trucking, such as the U.S. Brotherhood of Teamsters, who have
successfully misled the public into believing that Mexican motor
carriers will somehow operate as rogue trucks. For example, James
Hoffa, the president of the Brotherhood of Teamsters, stated in an
article that "[k]eeping America safe . . . means making sure our
families ... don't have to dodge 90,000-pound unguided missiles from
Mexico on our highways. ' '178 This memorable quote implies that
Mexican motor carriers will be larger and heavier than U.S. carriers.
In reality, Mexican motor carriers must comply with the same size
and weight restrictions as U.S. motor carriers.

176.
NAFTA Initial Mexican Submission, supranote 120, para. 112.
177.
Id.
178.
James P. Hoffa, Op.-Ed., Bush Lets Mexican Trucks Menace America's
Roads; TransportationSecretary Keeps Border Open an Additional Two Years, DETROIT
NEWS, Aug. 8, 2008, at 13.
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B. ParticularizedConcerns
As Mexico's laws and regulations regarding motor carriers differ
from those in the U.S., 1 79 granting Mexican motor carriers access to
the U.S. presents some additional safety concerns. For example,
Mexico does not generally limit the number of hours a truck driver
can operate his vehicle.' 8 0 Unlike the U.S., which requires driver
logbooks, Mexico does not require drivers to keep records of their
travels or hours of operation. 81' Once a Mexican driver crosses into
the U.S., he will have to follow U.S. laws and regulations on driver
hours and logbooks, l8 2 but this ignores the possibility that he may be
exhausted from driving for an extended period of time in Mexico
before crossing the U.S. border.
This safety concern is the product of different "regulatory
environments" between the U.S. and Mexico, and this specific
example has been repeatedly cited as an illustration of why crossborder trucking with Mexico cannot safely proceed.' 8 3 To resolve the
differences, the U.S. government has favored a "comprehensive,
integrated safety regime" between Mexico and the U.S., 8 4 but no
such regime has materialized. This Note proposes a much simpler
solution to this problem and other particularized concerns. NAFTA
gives the U.S. significant leeway to adopt regulations that would
apply only to Mexican motor carriers if those regulations are adopted
in good faith to "[ensure] compliance with the U.S. regulatory
regime."'18 5
Even Mexico concedes that the U.S. can impose
requirements that make the Mexican motor carriers "like" U.S. and
Canadian motor carriers.
Therefore, the U.S. should tailor new regulations to address
particularized concerns about Mexican motor carriers. For example,
a practical solution accounting for the difference in U.S. and Mexican
law on hours-of-service would be to impose a requirement that
Mexican motor carriers-or U.S. carriers returning to the U.S. after
operating in Mexico-rest for a certain time period somewhere in the
commercial zones of the U.S. before being allowed to proceed. The

179.
U.S. Counter-Submission, supra note 55, at 43 ("As elaborated in the
Statement of Facts, Mexican carriers in fact operate within a less stringent regulatory
regime than that in place in either Canada or the U.S.").
180. Id. at 43-44.
181.
Id.
182.
NAFTA Initial Mexican Submission, supra note 120, para. 112.
183.
See, e.g., U.S. Counter-Submission, supra note 55, at 43-44 (citing
examples of the problems with the different regulatory environments); Public Citizen,
supra note 24 (criticizing the Bush Administration for moving forward with the pilot
program without requiring Mexican trucking companies to meet the safety
requirements required of U.S. trucking companies thereby endangering the public).
184.
NAFTA Final Report, supranote 31, para. 155.
185.
Id. para. 301.
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regulation could also make an exception for truck drivers who
voluntarily stayed under the U.S. limits while operating in Mexico, if
the driver can prove that he complied with U.S. standards by showing
a logbook and supporting documents, such as receipts. This proposed
regulation adequately ensures that truck drivers entering the U.S.
are "like" U.S. truck drivers because it ensures that all truck drivers
in the U.S. are adequately rested. In addition, this regulation could
indirectly lead to a more harmonious regulatory system with Mexico
because it gives truck drivers an incentive to stay within the U.S.
hours-of-service limits while in Mexico in order to avoid a mandatory
stop in the U.S.
Another particularized concern comes from the different U.S.
and Mexican requirements regarding the inspection of motor carriers.
In the U.S., all motor carriers must obtain periodic safety inspections,
whereas a similar requirement does not exist in Mexico.s 6 This
example was also employed by the U.S. as a justification for not
complying with NAFTA.18 7 However, there is also an easy solution to
this safety concern.18 8 The U.S. should implement a regulation that
specifically requires Mexican motor carriers to undergo inspections in
the commercial zone of the U.S on a periodic basis. If the motor
carrier fails the inspection, then, like U.S. motor carriers, it should be
89
placed out-of-service until repaired.'
These are just a few examples of particularized concerns specific
to Mexican motor carriers. However, as the previous examples
illustrate, practical solutions for particularized concerns can be
relatively easy to envision and implement. Furthermore, once the
U.S. restarts a pilot trucking program with Mexico, DOT officials will
be better able to identify concerns specific to Mexican motor carriers
and rules and regulations that can address those concerns.
V. CONCLUSION

The Obama administration has promised to bring the U.S. into
compliance with NAFTA, 190 a goal the U.S. should have been
pursuing for the past thirteen years.
The administration and
Congress should begin this process by restarting a cross-border pilot
program similar to President Bush's Demonstration Project and then
reforming U.S. trucking policies to comply with NAFTA cross-border
obligations.

186.
U.S. Counter-Submission, supra note 55, at 44.
187.
Id.
188.
NAFTA Final Report, supra note 31, para. 300 (recommending that the
U.S. enforce its safety regulations against Mexican trucking companies the same way it
does against U.S. and Canadian trucking companies).
189.
Id.
190.
White House Press Release, supra note 1.
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Unfortunately, the international opinion of the U.S. has
dwindled in recent years. 19 1 The U.S. has an opportunity to combat
this declining international opinion by demonstrating that it is a
nation that honors its international obligations. If the U.S. continues
to disregard its commitments under NAFTA, it will further its
declining international reputation.
In addition, continuing
noncompliance may indirectly affect customary international law. 192
Though many might support U.S. noncompliance out of fear that
cross-border trucking will endanger the U.S., an expansive view of a
domestic safety exception could significantly derogate the
predictability of international treaty obligations. 193
Most
importantly, the U.S. should comply with NAFTA in order to restore
strong trade relations with Mexico-it's third-largest trading
partner. 194
In order to create a lasting solution to this problem, President
Obama should break the United States' volatile pattern and instead
pursue a solution that both complies with NAFTA and also employs
practical rules and regulations to minimize the particularized
concerns associated with Mexican motor carriers. The U.S. has been
in defiance of NAFTA for far too long; hopefully, in the near future, it
will correct its path and embrace NAFTA's cross-border trucking
provisions.

Chad MacDonald*
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Researchltradeandeconomicfreedom/BG1070.cfm ("By cheating on NAFTA, the Clinton
Administration has established a negative precedent that Mexico, Canada, and other
countries could follow in the future.").
193.
See id. (discussing the negative effects of noncompliance).
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